FRANKFURT (Reuters) - The following is an abridged text of the German Constitutional Court’s ruling on Tuesday which may force the Bundesbank to withdraw from the European Central Bank’s bond purchase programme.
In its judgment pronounced today, the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court granted several constitutional complaints directed against the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) of the European Central Bank (ECB). The Court found that the Federal Government and the German Bundestag violated the complainants’ rights ... by failing to take steps challenging that the ECB, in its decisions on the adoption and implementation of the PSPP, neither assessed nor substantiated that the measures provided for in these decisions satisfy the principle of proportionality.
In its Judgment of 11 December 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has taken a different stance in response to the request for a preliminary ruling from the Federal Constitutional Court; however, this does not merit a different conclusion in the present proceedings. The review undertaken by the CJEU with regard to whether the ECB’s decisions on the PSPP satisfy the principle of proportionality is not comprehensible; to this extent, the judgment was thus rendered ultra vires.
As regards the complainants’ challenge that the PSPP effectively circumvents Art. 123 TFEU, the Federal Constitutional Court did not find a violation of the prohibition of monetary financing of Member State budgets.
The decision published today does not concern any financial assistance measures taken by the European Union or the ECB in the context of the current coronavirus crisis...
In the decisions at issue, the ECB fails to conduct the necessary balancing of the monetary policy objective against the economic policy effects arising from the programme. Therefore, the decisions at issue violate Art. 5(1) second sentence and Art. 5(4) TEU and, in consequence, exceed the monetary policy mandate of the ECB.
The decisions at issue merely assert that the inflation target of levels below, but close to, 2% sought by the ECB has not yet been achieved and that less intrusive means are not available. They contain neither a prognosis as to the PSPP’s economic policy effects nor an assessment of whether any such effects were proportionate to the intended advantages in the area of monetary policy. It is not ascertainable that the ECB Governing Council did in fact consider and balance the effects that are inherent in and direct consequences of the PSPP, as these effects invariably result from the programme’s volume of more than two trillion euros and its duration of now more than three years. Given that the PSPP’s negative effects increase the more it grows in volume and the longer it is continued, a longer programme duration gives rise to stricter requirements as to the necessary balancing of interests...
The PSPP improves the refinancing conditions of the Member States as it allows them to obtain financing on the capital markets at considerably better conditions than would otherwise be the case; it thus has a significant impact on the fiscal policy terms under which the Member States operate. In particular, the PSPP could have the same effects as financial assistance instruments pursuant to Art. 12 et seq. ESM Treaty. The volume and duration of the PSPP may render the effects of the programme disproportionate, even where these effects are initially in conformity with primary law.
The PSPP also affects the commercial banking sector by transferring large quantities of high-risk government bonds to the balance sheets of the Eurosystem, which significantly improves the economic situation of the relevant banks and increases their credit rating. The economic policy effects of the PSPP furthermore include its economic and social impact on virtually all citizens, who are at least indirectly affected, inter alia as shareholders, tenants, real estate owners, savers or insurance policy holders. For instance, there are considerable losses for private savings. Moreover, as the PSPP lowers general interest rates, it allows economically unviable companies to stay on the market. Finally, the longer the programme continues and the more its total volume increases, the greater the risk that the Eurosystem becomes dependent on Member State politics as it can no longer simply terminate and undo the programme without jeopardising the stability of the monetary union.
It would have been incumbent upon the ECB to weigh these and other considerable economic policy effects and balance them, based on proportionality considerations, against the expected positive contributions to achieving the monetary policy objective the ECB itself has set. It is not ascertainable that any such balancing was conducted, neither when the programme was first launched nor at any point during its implementation. Unless the ECB provides documentation demonstrating that such balancing took place, and in what form, it is not possible to carry out an effective judicial review as to whether the ECB stayed within its mandate...
German constitutional organs, administrative authorities and courts may participate neither in the development nor in the implementation, execution or operationalisation of ultra vires acts. Following a transitional period of no more than three months allowing for the necessary coordination with the Eurosystem, the Bundesbank may thus no longer participate in the implementation and execution of the ECB decisions at issue, unless the ECB Governing Council adopts a new decision that demonstrates in a comprehensible and substantiated manner that the monetary policy objectives pursued by the PSPP are not disproportionate to the economic and fiscal policy effects resulting from the programme. On the same condition, the Bundesbank must ensure that the bonds already purchased and held in its portfolio are sold based on a – possibly long-term – strategy coordinated with the Eurosystem.
Reporting by Balazs Koranyi; editing by John Stonestreet